This volume collects contributions from leading scholars of early modern philosophy from a wide variety of philosophical and geographic backgrounds. The distinguished contributors offer very different, competing approaches to the history of philosophy.Many chapters articulate new, detailed methods of doing history of philosophy. These present conflicting visions of the history of philosophy as an autonomous sub-discipline of professional philosophy. Several other chapters offer new approaches to integrating history into one's philosophy by re-telling the history of recent philosophy. A number of (...) chapters explore the relationship between history of philosophy and history of science.Among the topics discussed and debated in the volume are: the status of the principle of charity; the nature of reading texts; the role of historiography within the history of philosophy; the nature of establishing proper context. (shrink)

In the first section I briefly consider some stituations in which standard desert-claims would be disputed, with the aim of revealing why and by whom they are asserted or denied. Having attained some understanding of the point of different desert-statements, I propose an accound of their content that entails the thesis that statements of positive desert (deserving something desirable) sharply differ in meaning from statements of negative desert (deserving something undesirable), even when expressed in the same form. In the second (...) section I use this ambiguity thesis to argue against an appealing way of defending Hegel's claim that a wrongdoer has a right to be punished and against Kant's defense of the view that there is a duty to punish those who deserve it. I also show how an understanding of negative desert that recognizes the ambiguity thesis enables us to defend the ordinary view of mercy against Kantian criticisms and to reject the popular misconception that mercy is necessarily at odds with justice. In the third section I use the ambiguity thesis to rebut the common claim (found in Mill and Aristotle, among others) that it is unjust for a person to have or be given mone benefits than she deserves. I conclude by showing how an understanding of positive desert that recognizes the ambiguity thesis leads to a rejection both of certain complaints against traditional systems of private property and also of certain moralistic scruples that might give pause to those who acknowledge the moral duty to assist the needy. (shrink)

In my paper ‘A Logic for Evidential Support’ (this Journal, 17 (1966), 21 ff.) the argument on page 25 is illustrated by wrong and misleading examples.1 The argument proceeds by considering statements logically equivalent to a universal hypothesis U1 that are formed by generalising analogously not about the individual elements of U1's domain of discourse, but about pairs, trios, or n-membered classes of these elements, where the domain of U1 has at least n elements. But the generalisations must be understood (...) distributively : not collectively, as the examples in the original version suggested. Such an equivalent for ‘All ravens are black’ will not be ‘All pairs of ravens are pairs of black things’, but ‘All pairs are pairs of things each of which is a raven only if black’. Similarly, instead of ‘If the pair a, b is a pair of ravens it is a pair of black things’ on page 26,1 should have written ‘The pair a, b is a pair of things each of which is a raven only if black’. If these alterations are made, the argument is unobjectionable, and the qualification about truth-functional conditionals, on page 25, is no longer required. (A corresponding correction should be made in the argument of ‘What has Confirmation to do with Probabilities ?’, Mind, 75 (1966), 474.). (shrink)

After discussing the interests that ground the right to democratic political participation, arguments for the disenfranchisement of those who commit serious criminal offenses are examined. The arguments are divided into two groups. The first group consists of arguments that are relatively independent of the justifying aims of punishment. It is conceded that two of these arguments establish that some, though by no means all, serious offenders should lose the vote for a period of time that does not necessarily overlap with (...) the duration of the other sanctions visited upon them. These arguments also imply that the state is justified in attempting to exclude the offenders in question from all forms of political participation, a position that arguably runs afoul of moral limits on punishment. The second group of arguments makes explicit reference to the justifying aims of punishment. None supports the blanket disenfranchisement of felons, though some may justify it in relation to some serious offenders for certain periods of time. All of the arguments supporting the disenfranchisement of serious offenders are most persuasive on the assumption that they live in reasonably just societies that are genuinely democratic. If that assumption is false or questionable, then it is argued that the force of such arguments may be weakened considerably. (shrink)

Some philosophers—call them pessimists–think we have reason to avoid deferring to testimony to settle our questions in domains where deep understanding is important. Extant defences of pessimism focus on whether deferring to testimony is ever sufficient for acquiring understanding. But I argue that these defences/articulations of pessimism are unsatisfactory. Even if deference to testimony were always insufficient for acquiring understanding—which seems doubtful—this would not explain why we have reason to avoid deferring in certain domains. Instead, I claim we should think (...) about how and when testimony can disincentivize and discourage agents’ coming to understand. I argue that deferring to testimony to settle a question often results in one having less reason to seek broader understanding and thereby sets one up to (continue to) lack understanding. The incentive pessimist appeals to this phenomenon to explain and defend the basic pessimist thought. (shrink)

Provability logics with many modal operators for progressions of theories obtained by iterating their consistency statements are introduced. The corresponding arithmetical completeness theorem is proved.

Cet article explore la conception spinozienne du rapport entre substance et mode en analysant les notions de cause de soi, de cause immanente et de puissance. Nous soutenons que la théorie spinozienne de la causalité constitue une tentative pour développer une ontologie relationnelle de la puissance dans laquelle toute dénomination intrinsèque est fondée sur une dénomination extrinsèque. Par opposition à une interprétation courante selon laquelle la substance de Spinoza est une sorte de grande monade dans laquelle toutes choses inhèrent comme (...) les prédicats inhèrent à un sujet logique, nous maintenons que l’ontologie de l’immanence opère une extériorisation radicale de l’être : pour un mode fini, « exister » est s’extérioriser en tant que cause, c’est-à-dire agir. La substance, en revanche, n’est rien que la causalité en tant que telle, ou une forme absolue de l’extériorité. Par conséquent, quand Spinoza maintient que toutes choses sont « en Dieu » , la préposition in ne signifie pas s’intérioriser « dans un sujet » , mais plutôt s’extérioriser « dans l’action » .In this paper, I explore Spinoza’s conception of the relation between substance and mode through an analysis of the notions of self-causation, immanent causation and power. I argue that Spinoza’s theory of causality constitutes an attempt to develop a relational ontology of power where all intrinsic denominations are grounded in extrinsic ones. In opposition to a current reading according to which Spinoza’s substance is similar to a huge monad in which things inhere in the same way as predicates inhere in a logical subject, I argue that the ontology of immanence implies a radical exteriorization of being : for a finite mode, « to be » is to exteriorize itself as a cause, i.e. to act. As for substance, it is nothing but causality or action as such, an absolute form of exteriority. Hence, when Spinoza maintains that all things are « in God » , the preposition does not signify the interiorization « in a subject » , but rather an exteriorization « in action ». (shrink)

The increasing demand for horticultural products for nutritional and economic purposes by lesser developed countries (LDC's) is well-documented. Technological demands of the LDC's producing horticultural products is also increasing. Pesticide use is an integral component of most agricultural production, yet chemicals are often supplied without supplemental information vital for their safe and efficient implementation. Illiteracy rates in developing countries are high, making pesticide education even more challenging. For women, who perform a significant share of agricultural tasks, illiteracy rates are even (...) higher than for men. The dilemma exists of how a developing country can improve its nutritional and economic situation without giving consideration to social and environmental consequences. (shrink)

Prominent thinkers such as Jurgen Habermas and Michael Sandel are warning that biomedical enhancements will undermine fundamental political values. Yet whether biomedical enhancements will undermine such values depends on how biomedical enhancements will function, how they will be administered and to whom. Since only few enhancements are obtainable, it is difficult to tell whether these predictions are sound. Nevertheless, such warnings are extremely valuable. As a society we must, at the very least, be aware of developments that could have harmful (...) consequences. Indeed, if important values were to be jeopardized, we should take appropriate measures to protect them. This paper focuses on four central values: solidarity, personal responsibility, equality and autonomy. It delineates the conditions under which biomedical enhancements would undermine these values. It also details the circumstances under which these values would be unaffected by enhancements as well as those under which they would be promoted. Specifying these conditions is valuable; it would enable society to prepare appropriate ethical guidelines and policy responses in advance. (shrink)

There is ongoing ethical and legal debate about withdrawing life sup- port for patients with disorders of consciousness (DOCs). Frequently fu- eling the debate are implicit assumptions about the value of life in a state of impaired consciousness, and persistent uncertainty about the quality of life (QoL) of these persons. Yet there are no validated methods for assessing QoL in this population, and a significant obstacle to doing so is their inability to communicate. Recent neuroscientific discoveries might circumvent that problem (...) and help shed light on QoL in DOCs. There is an ethical imperative to prioritize QoL research in this patient population, to provide evidence to inform treatment, research, and end of life decisions. A minimalist and pragmatic model of QoL is proposed, targeting positive and negative affect as domains for which there is po- tential to reach across the communication gap, and restore to these voiceless persons some measure of control. (shrink)

Evolutionary theory has an unexpected application in philosophy of mind, where it is used by the so-called biosemantic program—also called the teleosemantic program— to account for the representational capacities of neural states and processes in a way that conforms to an overarching scientific naturalism. Biosemantic theories account for the representational capacities of neural states and processes by appealing in particular to their evolutionary function, as that function is determined by a process of natural selection. As a result, biosemantic theories have (...) distinct advantages over other theories of mental representation—e.g., Fodor’s causal theory. Foremost among the advantages of biosemantic theories is their ability to account for the possibility of mental misrepresentation. (shrink)

Patricia White has recently attempted to construct an ethically valid notion of forgiveness that will serve educational purposes and contribute to the moral development of pupils in schools. She distinguishes between a strict view that requires repentance before forgiveness, which she rejects, and a relaxed view that does not require repentance, which she endorses. In this reply I defend the strict view of forgiveness against her criticism and challenge the ethical propriety of the relaxed view. I shall argue that her (...) support for the relaxed view both runs counter to our deepest moral intuitions and serves to undermine the moral law and moral endeavour. (shrink)